The opinion of the court was delivered by: Deborah K. Chasanow United States District Judge
Presently pending and ready for review in this medical malpractice case is the motion for summary judgment filed by Plaintiffs Holley and Michael Whitfield against Defendants Gastrointestinal Associates of Maryland, P.A. ("GAM") and Dr. Lornette Mills. (ECF No. 17). The issues have been fully briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the following reasons, the motion for summary judgment will be denied.
The sole issue presented in this early motion for summary judgment is whether Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment as to the liability of two of the defendants, GAM and Dr. Lornette Mills, based on their alleged failure to file required certificates of qualified experts and attesting reports in a timely fashion. The history of the case is as follows: On September 28, 2008, Plaintiff Holley Whitfield went to the emergency department at Southern Maryland Hospital, complaining of abdominal pain and vomiting blood. After undergoing a series of tests and treatments over a number of days, Ms. Whitfield was transferred to the Medical College of Virginia, where she was ultimately treated for acute mesenteric ischemia, a malady not diagnosed at Southern Maryland Hospital. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, including GAM and Dr. Mills, provided inadequate care and treatment to Plaintiff Holley Whitfield from September 29, to October 3, 2008.
The Maryland Health Care Malpractice Claims Act (the "Malpractice Claims Act"), Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. §§ 3-2A-01 et seq., governs the procedures for medical malpractice claims in the state of Maryland. See, e.g., Carroll v. Kontis, 400 Md. 167, 172 (2007). On September 26, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a Statement of Claim in the Healthcare Alternative Dispute Resolution Office ("HCADRO"). The HCADRO is an administrative body established by the Malpractice Claims Act.
The Malpractice Claims Act requires a plaintiff to file an expert report and certificate with the HCADRO. This report and certificate are to outline the "departure from standards of care, and that the departure from standards of care is the proximate cause of the alleged injury." Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-2A-04(b)(1)(i)(1), (b)(3)(i). After filing two requests for extensions of time, Plaintiffs filed two certificates and reports of qualified experts on June 8, 2012. The certificate of service included with the filing of these certificates and reports notes the date and method of service as "via U.S. Mail & Email" on June 8, 2012. (ECF No. 24-4). The day before, Plaintiffs' counsel handed copies of these certificates and reports to counsel for Dr. Mills and GAM while at a deposition of one of the parties.
If liability is disputed, the Malpractice Claims Act requires that a defendant file, within 120 days of service of the plaintiff's certificate and report, a similar expert certificate and report "attesting to compliance with standards of care, or that the departure from standards of care is not the proximate cause of the alleged injury." Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-2A-04(b)(2)(i). A claim "may be adjudicated in favor of the claimant or plaintiff on the issue of liability, if the defendant disputes liability and fails to file a certificate of a qualified expert" inside of the 120 day window. Id. (emphasis added).
Between the filing of the plaintiff's expert certificate and report, and sixty days after all parties have filed expert certificates and reports, any party can waive arbitration, which terminates proceedings in the HCADRO. See id. at § 3-2A-06B(a) to (d)(1). The Malpractice Claims Act notes that suit may then be filed in either Maryland circuit court or the U.S. District Court. Id. at §§ 3-2A-06A(c), 06B(f).
On July 13, 2012, Plaintiffs requested from the HCADRO a panel of potential arbitrators, and on July 24, 2012 all Defendants filed an election to waive arbitration under the Malpractice Claims Act. On July 27, 2012, HCADRO ordered transfer to this court. Plaintiffs filed their complaint on September 14, 2012. (ECF No. 1). Defendants Mills and GAM filed their certificates and reports on October 9, 2012. On October 10, 2012, a scheduling order was entered. (ECF No. 15). Among other things, this order set the deadline for Defendants' Rule 26(a)(2) disclosures at January 8, 2013. (Id.). On October 16, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment against GAM and Dr. Mills, (ECF No. 17), which these Defendants opposed on October 31 (ECF No. 24). Plaintiffs replied on November 13. (ECF No. 25).
Summary judgment may be entered only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is inappropriate if any material factual issue "may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); JKC Holding Co. LLC v. Wash. Sports Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 465 (4th Cir. 2001).
"A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment 'may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,' but rather must 'set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting former Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). "A mere scintilla of proof . . . will not suffice to prevent summary judgment." Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 314 (4th Cir. 2003). "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249--50 (citations omitted). At the same time, the facts that are presented must be construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007); Emmett, 532 F.3d at 297.
Plaintiffs claim that by personally handing copies of their expert certificates and reports to Defendants' counsel at the June 7, 2012 deposition, they "served" Defendants pursuant to Md. Rule 1-321, which provides "[s]ervice upon the attorney or upon a party shall be made by delivery of a copy . . . Delivery of a copy within this Rule means: handing it to the attorney or to the party." Accordingly, they argue that the clock began to run on June 7, and that Defendants' expert certificate and report was due 120 days later, October 5. Defendants argue that they were not officially served with the certificates until they were filed, on June 8. Furthermore, they argue that the filing notes that service was effected "via U.S. Mail & Email" on June 8, 2012, not by hand on June 7. Accordingly, they argue that the 120 day clock did not begin to run until June 8, and that their report was therefore not due until October 6, which was a Saturday and ...