The opinion of the court was delivered by: James K. Bredar United States District Judge
Jana Cantrel filed this civil suit against the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2671-2680. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) She seeks money damages for alleged negligence, which took the form of medical malpractice and negligent transmission of information to Cantrel and third parties (id. ¶¶ 18, 19), and for intentional infliction of emotional distress (¶¶ 23-25) by doctors at Chase Brexton Health Services, Inc., in Baltimore, Maryland. Specifically, she was told erroneously in early January 2011 that her hepatitis C had reappeared, which meant that she would need to go through the arduous and intensive treatment required for that disease. (Id. ¶¶ 7-9.) Three weeks later, she was informed by a different doctor at Chase Brexton that her blood tests had shown Cantrel did not have the disease after all. (Id. ¶ 12.) In the interim, the doctor who had misdiagnosed her recurrence of hepatitis C told an insurance company, to which Cantrel had submitted an application for life insurance, that she had hepatitis C and a mental or nervous disorder. (Id. ¶ 13.) Neither statement was true. (Id.) Cantrel was denied life insurance based upon the doctor's misstatements. (Id. ¶ 14.)
Several motions are pending before the Court: the Government's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 8), Cantrel's motion to order early mediation (ECF No. 13), and Cantrel's motion for leave to amend her complaint (ECF No. 14). Because amendment of the complaint would partially nullify the Government's motion to dismiss, Cantrel's motion for leave to amend will be first addressed.
II. Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint
A. Standard for Amendment of Complaint
In the circumstances presented here, when the defendant has not filed a responsive pleading and when no deadline set in a scheduling order for filing motions for leave to amend has passed, a motion for permission to amend the complaint is governed by Rule 15(a), which directs the Court to "freely give leave when justice so requires." The Fourth Circuit has stated that leave to amend under Rule 15(a) should be denied only in three situations: when the opposing party would be prejudiced, when the amendment is sought in bad faith, or when the proposed amendment would be futile. Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426 (4th Cir. 2006).
Since the Government does not claim it would be prejudiced by granting leave to Cantrel to amend and does not claim that amendment would be futile, the Court evaluates this matter to determine whether Cantrel's proposed amendment is in bad faith. The essence of the Government's argument is that Cantrel failed to satisfy the requirements of Maryland's statutory law on the filing of claims against health care providers insofar as Cantrel's original complaint sought $300,000. That amount of money requires exhaustion of an administrative claims procedure before filing suit, and Cantrel did not exhaust her claim. Because Cantrel seeks to amend her complaint to claim damages of $30,000-less than the amount triggering that administrative claims procedure-the Government contends her amendment is in bad faith.
(Def.'s Opp. 4-6, ECF No. 16.) The Court finds no merit in the Government's argument. The clear purpose of Cantrel's proposed amendment is to have a viable claim against the Government. She can have that with a maximum damages demand of $30,000. Revising the complaint has the effect of substituting a viable claim for a nonviable claim. No bad faith can be found. Cantrel's motion will be granted.
A. Standard for Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)
A complaint must contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Facial plausibility exists "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. An inference of a mere possibility of misconduct is not sufficient to support a plausible claim. Id. at 679. As the Twombly opinion stated, "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." 550 U.S. at 555. "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' . . . Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, ...