Appeal from the Criminal Court of Baltimore; Sodaro, J.
Henderson, Hammond, Prescott, Marbury and Sybert, JJ. Sybert, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
In order to test the constitutionality of the Maryland motion picture censorship statute, the appellant invited arrest by exhibiting the motion picture film "Revenge at Daybreak" at a theatre in Baltimore City without first having submitted the film to the Maryland State Board of Motion Picture Censors for approval and licensing, as required by Code (1957), Art. 66A, Sec. 2.*fn1 He was indicted and tried in the Criminal Court of Baltimore for violation of Sec. 2, and convicted after his timely motions for judgment of acquittal were denied. He now appeals.
The appellant has attempted, both in the court below and on this appeal, to attack the constitutionality of Art. 66A in its entirety, even though he was tried and convicted only for violation
of Sec. 2. The principal contention is that the statute is void on its face as an unconstitutional infringement upon free speech and press violative of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution (made applicable to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment) and of Art. 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The appellant then argues that in the defense of a criminal prosecution under Sec. 2 of Art. 66A he is entitled to challenge the constitutionality of the entire statute "since he is charged with a violation under the Act." Acting upon that premise, he proceeds to attack separately what he asserts are constitutional infirmities of certain features of the Act. His claims are that the Act fails to provide adequate procedural safeguards (although he noted that Sec. 19 of Art. 66A affords an appeal to the Baltimore City Court and thence to this Court); that the standards established by Sec. 6*fn2 of the
Act are vague and hence invalid as construed and applied; that the statute deprives him of equal protection of the law in that newsreels and noncommercial exhibitors such as educational, charitable, fraternal and religious organizations are excluded from the operation of the Act; and that the fee charged for the inspection and licensing of a film constitutes an invalid tax upon the exercise of freedom of speech.
The State maintained below and here that the statute is not void on its face, and that since the appellant did not submit his film to the Board for approval and licensing he lacks standing to challenge any provision or requirement of Art. 66A, except the provisions of Sec. 2, for violation of which he was convicted. The trial court agreed with the position of the State. Parenthetically, it is noted that neither the appellant nor the State even suggests that the film "Revenge at Daybreak" would violate any of the standards set out in the statute, and the State conceded that it would have been approved had it been submitted for licensing.
We shall first consider the appellant's main attack -- that the Maryland statute is void on its face as an unconstitutional prior restraint imposed upon the freedoms of speech and press protected against State action by the First and Fourteenth Amendments and by Art. 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 96 L. Ed. 1098 (1952), held that motion pictures are within the ambit of protection which the First Amendment, through the Fourteenth, affords to speech and the press, and struck down the use of "sacrilegious" as a permissible censorship standard. However, the Court intimated that some form of censorship might be permissible when it said (at p. 502 of 343 U.S.): "To hold that liberty of expression by means of motion pictures is guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, however, is not the end of our problem. It does not follow that the Constitution requires absolute freedom to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all times and all places. That much is evident from the series of decisions of this Court with respect to other media of communication of ideas." The Court further stated (ibid.) in considering the argument that motion pictures possess a greater capacity
for evil, particularly among the youth of a community, than other modes of expression: "If there be capacity for evil it may be relevant in determining the permissible scope of community control, but it does not authorize substantially unbridled censorship such as we have here." Subsequent to Burstyn, a number of film censorship cases reached the Supreme Court which involved questions of standards. The films in those cases had all been submitted to the appropriate authorities and permits ...